We develop a two-period, three-class of income model where low-income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium where the constrained low-income and the unconstrained high-income agents favor low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.
Introduction
The conventional wisdom is that a higher inequality of income results in a larger redistributive public expenditure and that it results in a greater issue of government debt that finances redistribution. This theoretical prediction builds on a median-voter framework, in which a higher level of inequality translates into a poorer decisive agent in the political arena, who will then demand more redistribution (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1999 ) and, thus, more government debt issue for financing redistribution (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989) .
The empirical evidence, however, does not necessarily support the above-mentioned theoretical predictions. OECD cross-country data show that the volume of redistribution is negatively correlated with income inequality (for example, Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Chen and Song, 2009 ). The theoretical prediction of inequality and government debt is also controversial. For instance, Belgium, France and Germany, located in the Continental Europe, show low Gini coefficients and high debt-to-GDP ratios, whereas the United Kingdom and the United States, included in the Anglo-Saxon group, show high Gini coefficients and low debt-to-GDP ratios. 1 A negative correlation between inequality and debt-to-GDP ratio is observed for some OECD countries. This indicates that the relationship between inequality and the size of government is not as simple as the standard theory might expect. Several theories have been provided to make sense of the above-mentioned puzzles.
Examples include political bias toward the rich (Benabou, 2000) , the prospect of upward mobility by low-income agents (Quadrini, 1999; Benabou and Ok, 2001 ; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Arawatari and Ono, 2009), lobbying and campaign contributions by the rich (Rodriguez, 2004; Campante, 2010) , voters' preferences for redistribution (Creedy and Moslehi, 2009; Creedy, Li and Moslehi, 2010) , and borrowing constraints that hit low-income agents (Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2000; Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 2007; Cremer et al., 2007) . These studies, however, assume that redistributive expenditure is financed only via income tax. In other words, they abstract away government debt as an additional option for financing redistributive expenditure even though government debt is one of the major sources of government revenue in OECD countries. The purpose of this paper is to consider the relationship between inequality and the size of government debt when voting results in a negative correlation between inequality and redistributive expenditure. In particular, we focus on the role of borrowing constraints 1 Gini coefficients in Belgium, France and Germany in the mid-2000s were 0.271, 0.270 and 0.298, respectively; debt-to-GDP ratios in those countries in 2005 were 0.957, 0.760 and 0.711, respectively. In contrast, Gini coefficients in the United Kingdom and the United States in the mid-2000s were 0.335 and 0.381, respectively; debt-to-GDP ratios in these countries in 2005 were 0.461 and 0.623, respectively. The source of the Gini coefficients is OECD (2008) , and the source of the debt-to-GDP ratio is OECD (2009).
freely from the second period to the first period. Because of this constraint, the utility gain from government expenditure in the future is valued less than the utility loss from government expenditure today for the borrowing-constrained agents. Therefore, they prefer less government expenditure and, thus, lower first-period income tax and debt as their first-period income becomes lower.
Given the above-mentioned feature of the model, we obtain the following three results. First, the type of decisive voter depends on the degree of capital market imperfection. The decisive voter is the middle-income, borrowing-unconstrained agent when the degree of capital market imperfection is low. However, the decisive voter becomes the low-income, borrowing-constrained agent when the degree is high. That is, the economy displays the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, as in Epple and Romano (1996) , where the highand low-income agents, who favor low government expenditure and debt, form a coalition against the middle who favor high government expenditure and debt.
The second result is that the political equilibrium generally fails to attain the efficient allocation. That is, first-period tax, government debt and expenditure in the political equilibrium are higher or lower than the efficient levels depending on either the income level of a decisive voter or the degree of capital market imperfection. In particular, under a certain condition, there exists a critical level of capital market imperfection such that the political equilibrium levels of first-period tax, government debt and expenditure are lower than the efficient levels when the degree of capital market imperfection is above the critical level. This result implies that countries with less access to capital markets are more likely to attain lower levels of first-period tax, government debt and expenditure than the efficient levels. The third result is that the effect of income distribution on the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the degree of capital market imperfection. In particular, there exists a critical level of capital market imperfection, which is different from that described in the last paragraph, such that the income distribution results in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree of capital market imperfection is below the critical level, and the standard result a la Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) holds. However, when the degree is above the critical level, the opposite result holds because the decisive voter, who is a borrowingconstrained low-income agent, wants to choose lower government expenditure and debt. That is, there is a negative correlation between inequality and debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree of capital market imperfection is high.
Our analysis and results contribute to the following three strands of literature. The first strand is the literature on inequality and redistribution in the presence of borrowing constraints. Examples are Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000), Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007), Cremer et al. (2007) and Arawatari and Ono (2011) . These stud-ies demonstrate that the decisive voter prefers a lower income tax as his/her income is decreased when he/she is borrowing constrained. Thus, they clarify the role of borrowing constraint in presenting the negative correlation between inequality and the preferred tax for redistribution. However, government debt is abstracted away in these studies. The current paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating how the politically determined size of government debt is affected by income distribution in the presence of borrowing constraints.
The second strand is the literature on tax smoothing and government debt (for example, Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Aiyagari et al., 2002) . Our model demonstrates that, in an efficient allocation, the tax rates should be equal between two periods, and the size of government debt is adjusted to smooth tax rates across periods. However, the model demonstrates that, in political equilibrium, the first-period tax rate becomes lower or higher than the efficient rate depending on either the income level of a decisive voter or the degree of capital market imperfection. The result suggests that the presence of borrowing constraint might prevent the realization of tax smoothing in the political economy.
The third strand is the literature on the politics of government debt. Although there are many studies that consider how the size of government debt is determined via politics, most of them abstract away the role of income inequality among voters in the determination of government debt. Previous studies instead have focused on the roles of common pool problems (for example, Tabellini, 1986; Velasco, 1999) An exception is the study of Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) , which demonstrates the positive correlation between inequality and government debt: a higher level of inequality results in a greater issue of government debt. However, as mentioned above, empirical evidence suggests that the relationship is not so straightforward: some countries are featured by low inequality and high debt-to-GDP ratio, whereas others are characterized by high inequality and low debt-to-GDP ratio. The current paper demonstrates that there is a negative correlation between inequality and debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree of capital market imperfection is high. The result could provide one possible explanation for the empirical evidence among some OECD countries.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
where the superscript u denotes "unconstrained".
We substitute the saving function into the borrowing constraint (3) to obtain the condition where a type-i agent is actually unconstrained in terms of the tax rates τ 1 and τ 2 :
This condition states that the borrowing constraint of a type-i agent does not bind when his/her after-tax income is high in the first period and is low in the second period. Alternatively, suppose that the borrowing constraint is binding; that is, (7) fails to hold. The solution to the utility maximization problem yields:
where the superscript c denotes "constrained". 
Policy Preferences, the Political Institution and Voting
In the voting stage, agents vote over policies to maximize their indirect utility. In order to set up this maximization problem, we first derive the indirect utility functions in terms of tax rates. For this purpose, we substitute the consumption functions derived in the previous subsection into the utility function U i and obtain the following:
The productivity in the second stage, e i 2 , depends on the government expenditure G and, thus, on the tax rates τ 1 and τ 2 . In order to write e i 2 as a function of τ 1 and τ 2 , we define:
and rewrite E 2 as a function of E 1 :
The variable E 1 shows the marginal effect of public expenditure G on the second-period GDP, denoted by E 2 .
We utilize
µ and E 2 = G E 1 to rewrite two government budget constraints (1) and (2) as follows:
where
We impose the following assumption:
The inequality condition of 1 < γ ensures that the tax rate in the second period is set within the range (0, 1/2) in equilibrium. Given τ ∈ (0, 1/2), the term appeared in (11) and (12) is positive as long as γ < 2. Therefore, the condition of γ < 2 ensures that B > 0 and G > 0 hold in equilibrium; otherwise the economy experiences (a) international 8 lending of assets rather than borrowing and (b) no government expenditure, both of which are not considered in this paper. The inequality condition of γ < 2 also guarantees the single-peakedness of preferences over τ 1 and τ 2 . These roles of Assumption 1 are found in the following analysis.
By the use of (11), we can present the lifetime income of a type-i agent as a function of tax rates:
With the above-mentioned lifetime income, the indirect utility function of a type-i agent becomes:
The tax rates τ 1 and τ 2 are determined by individuals through a political process of majoritarian voting. Because the issue space is bidimensional, the Nash equilibrium of a majoritarian voting game may fail to exist. To deal with this feature, we use the concept of issue-by-issue voting, or structure-induced equilibrium, as formalized by Shepsle (1979) .
In particular, if preferences are single peaked for each policy issue, a sufficient condition for (τ * 1 , τ * 2 ) to be an equilibrium of the voting game is that τ * 1 represents the outcome of majority voting over τ 1 when the other dimension is fixed at τ * 2 , and vice versa. In Appendix A.1, it is shown that preferences are indeed single peaked along every dimension of the issue space.
We can now solve the problem in the voting stage. A type-i agent chooses τ 1 to maximize his/her indirect utility given τ 2 ; and he/she chooses τ 2 to maximize his/her indirect utility given τ 1 . The threshold level of capital market imperfection for a type-i agent, denoted by ψ i , is derived by substituting his/her preferred pair of tax rates into the condition (7). The following proposition states policy preferences of agents.
Proposition 1.
The most preferred policy by a type-i agent satisfies:
where ψ i is given by:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
For each type of i, there is a threshold level of capital market imperfection, denoted by ψ i . When the degree of imperfection is higher, such that ψ ≤ ψ i , any agent belonging to class i is borrowing constrained. The threshold level ψ i becomes higher as the productivity in the first period becomes lower:
That is, an agent belonging to a lower class is more likely to be borrowing constrained. The degree of capital market imperfection critically affects the preferences over policy.
In order to understand the role of capital market imperfection, we first consider its impact on the preference over the government expenditure financed by the first-period tax and debt. On the one hand, raising the government expenditure decreases the utility today through an increase in the first-period tax burden. On the other hand, raising the government expenditure, financed by an increase in the first-period tax and debt issue, increases the utility in the future through an improvement in labor productivity. Therefore, the most preferred first-period tax and debt are determined to equate negative and positive effects at a margin. When a type-i agent is borrowing unconstrained, he/she can choose τ (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989 ): a richer agent prefers lower tax and debt issue. However, when he/she is borrowing constrained, he/she cannot reallocate income freely from the second period to the first period. Given this limitation, the utility gain in the future is less valued than the utility loss today. Therefore, a constrained agent prefers a lower level of government expenditure and, thus, lower firstperiod tax and debt as he/she becomes poorer. Voters' preferences over the second-period tax rate are unaffected by types and capital market imperfection. This property depends on the specification of the second-period productivity, e The most preferred levels of government expenditure and public debt by a type-i agent are derived by substituting (τ i 1 )
* and (τ i 2 ) * into the government budget constraints (11) and (12 
holds from (11) and (12), and (τ i 2 ) * is independent of the type of an agent and is simply
The following corollary states how policy preferences of agents are affected by capital market imperfection when agents are borrowing constrained.
Corollary 1
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
[ Figure 1 about here.] Figure 1 illustrates how voters' preferences over policies (τ 1 , G, B) are affected by the degree of capital market imperfection, denoted by ψ. When they are borrowing unconstrained, their choice of τ 1 , G and B is independent of capital market imperfection. However, when they are borrowing constrained, their choice depends on the degree of capital market imperfection. A lower ψ implies that they are more constrained. In order to relax the constraint, they prefer a lower first-period tax rate and, thus, prefer a lower level of government expenditure.
Political Equilibrium
Based on the characterization of voting behavior of each type of an agent, we now consider the determination of structure-induced equilibrium policies via majority voting. The second-period tax rate is given by τ 2 = 1 − 1/γ because all types of agents prefer this rate. Given τ 2 = 1 − 1/γ, the equilibrium first-period tax rate is given by the most preferred τ 1 by the median voter. The equilibrium levels of government expenditure and debt are then given by the preferred levels by the median voter over τ 1 .
In order to determine the median voter over τ 1 , we introduce the critical level of the first-period income, e 1 , defined by:
Direct calculation leads to:
When the first-period productivity of a type-i agent is high such that e
always holds for a type-i agent. In other words, he/she is borrowing unconstrained for any degree of capital market imperfection of ψ ∈ [1, +∞). He/she has enough income in the first period that is beyond the critical level e 1 and, thus, can choose a combination of consumption and saving that does not hit the borrowing constraint from the viewpoint of utility maximization. In contrast, an agent might be borrowing constrained for a low ψ if e i 1 ≤ e 1 holds. In order to reduce a set of possible political equilibria, we impose the following assumption with respect to e 1 .
Assumption 2. e
Assumption 2 ensures that type-h agents are never borrowing constrained. Therefore, given the properties of preferred first-period tax rate, demonstrated in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, the decisive voter will be a type-l or a type-m agent. The following proposition determines the decisive voter, contingent on the degree of capital market imperfection.
Proposition 2 The decisive voter over τ 1 is a borrowing-constrained type-l agent if
ψ ∈ [1, ψ] , and a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent if ψ ∈ ( ψ, ∞) where:
given by:
,
Proof. See Appendix A.5. Figure 2 illustrates the political equilibrium policies τ * 1 , G * and B * . As demonstrated in the figure, the identity of the median voter depends on the degree of capital market imperfection, denoted by ψ: a higher ψ means a lower degree of capital market imperfection. When an agent is less likely to be borrowing constrained, such that ψ > ψ, the decisive voter becomes the type-m agent who is borrowing unconstrained. Their preferred policies lie between those by type-l and type-h agents. However, when an agent is more likely to be borrowing constrained, such that ψ < ψ, there is an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium: the decisive voter is the borrowing-constrained, type-l agent. He/she prefers a lower tax rate and, thus, lower levels of government expenditure and debt than the type-m agent because of the strict financial constraint. The policies preferred by the borrowing-constrained type-l agent lie between those by type-m and type-h agents.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Welfare Implication
In this section, we evaluate the political equilibrium in terms of efficiency. Following Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007), we focus on the set of policy variables that maximize the present discounted value (PDV) of aggregate disposable income. We compare it with the political equilibrium policies and investigate under what condition the political equilibrium results in an excess burden of tax and debt. The PDV of aggregate disposable income, denoted by I, is given by:
that is,
The first term on the right-hand side is the aggregate disposable income in the first period, and the second term is the present value of the aggregate disposable income in the second period.
The first-period tax rate τ 1 has two competing effects on PDV of aggregate disposable
income. An increase in τ 1 creates a negative effect via a decrease in the first-period aftertax income, and a positive effect via an increase in the government expenditure devoted to education. A social planner chooses τ 1 to equate these two competing effects at a margin. The second-period tax τ 2 also has two competing effects via the second-period 13 after-tax income and government expenditure. The planner chooses τ 2 to equate these two competing effects at a margin. 
The planner chooses the same tax rates between the two periods in order to smooth tax burdens over periods. The corresponding levels of government expenditure and debt are calculated by substituting τ e 1 and τ e 2 into the government budget constraints:
A noteworthy feature is that the second-period tax rate in the political equilibrium
In order to understand the mechanism behind this result, we focus on the term related to τ 2 . In the political equilibrium, the decisive voter j chooses τ 2 to maximize his/her second-period after-tax income, given by:
.
In contrast, in the efficient allocation, the planner chooses τ 2 to maximize the aggregate second-period after-tax income given by:
The objective functions are different between the two problems. However, the terms related to τ 2 are equivalent between the two problems; both are given by ( 
. This is because the government expenditure G, given in (1), enters into these two objective functions in a linear fashion. Therefore, we can obtain the efficient second-period tax rate in the political equilibrium. The efficiency generally fails to hold as regards τ 1 , G and B. The following proposition demonstrates the conditions for which the political equilibrium levels of τ 1 , G and B are higher or lower than the efficient levels. hold. Then,
where:
Proof. See Appendix A.6. Figure 3 illustrates the result in Proposition 3. In order to provide the interpretation of the result in Proposition 3, we focus on the first-period tax rate because the properties of government expenditure and debt are qualitatively similar to those of the first-period tax rate. After describing the efficiency of the first-period tax rate, we discuss the efficiency of debt issue in relation to the previous studies.
[ Figure 3 about here.]
In the current framework, efficiency requires the same tax rates between the two periods in order to smooth the tax burden across periods. However, the political equilibrium realizes a lower or a higher first-period tax rate than the efficient one depending on either the income level of a decisive voter or the degree of capital market imperfection.
To confirm this argument, consider first the case of a low degree of capital market imperfection such that ψ >ψ: an unconstrained middle-income agent becomes the decisive voter. He/she prefers a lower first-period tax rate than the efficient one when his/her income is high such that e m 1 > (AE 1 /Rγ 2 ) 1 1−µ ; otherwise, he/she prefers a higher tax rate. Therefore, the decisive voter's income level affects the efficiency of the politicalequilibrium first-period tax rate when he/she is borrowing unconstrained.
Next, consider the case of a high degree of capital market imperfection such that ψ <ψ: the decisive voter is the constrained low-income agent. As demonstrated in Subsection 3.2, a constrained agent prefers a lower tax rate as the degree of imperfection is increased. This implies that a further imperfection improves tax smoothing when the preferred tax rate by the decisive voter is initially higher than the efficient one, while it prevents tax smoothing when the preferred tax rate is initially lower than the efficient level. Therefore, the degree of capital market imperfection determines the degree of difference from the efficient rate when the decisive voter is borrowing constrained.
Given the discussion so far, we can now state that the political equilibrium does not necessarily result in an overissue of public debt in the current framework. Previous studies, in general, show that the politics results in an overissue of public debt because of common-pool problems (Tabellini, 1986; Velasco, 1999) and political instability (Persson and Svensson, 1989; Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990 ). In the real world, however, some countries, such as Australia, Korea and New Zealand, do control successfully the issue of public debt (OECD, 2009). These countries could be viewed as issuing public debt below the efficient level. The result of underissue of public debt in the current framework may provide one possible explanation for these countries.
Income Inequality and Borrowing Constraint
The analysis so far has demonstrated the political equilibrium policy given the distribution of income. This section takes a step toward changing a situation. In particular, we consider an increase in the initial income of the high type, e h 1 , coupled with a decrease in the initial income of the low type, e l 1 .
3 We focus on the term
which represents the marginal impact of government expenditure on the second-period GDP. Then, we consider the spread of income distribution, keeping E 1 unchanged. Under the E 1 -preserving spread of income distribution, the second-period tax rate is unchanged because it is given by τ Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The result in Proposition 4 states that the effect of income inequality on the debt-to-GDP ratio depends heavily on the degree of capital market imperfection, denoted by ψ.
The spread of income distribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree of capital market imperfection is high such that ψ ∈ [1, ψ l ]. However, it results in a higher debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree is low such that ψ ∈ ( ψ l , ∞). In order to understand the mechanism behind this result, we present three key results about agents' preferences being affected by the spread of income distribution. Based on the results, we demonstrate illustratively the effect of income distribution on the debt-to-GDP ratio. First, recall the threshold level of capital market imperfection for a type-j agent (j = l, m), denoted by ψ j (Proposition 1):
The threshold level is increased by the spread of income distribution in the following two ways. Given ψ, the spread of income distribution decreases type-l ′ s labor earnings and, thus, decreases his/her after-tax income. In addition, a decrease in the type-l ′ s income induces him/her to choose a higher first-period tax rate, which results in a lower aftertax income for every agent as long as the type-l agent is a decisive voter. Because of these two negative effects on the after-tax income, the type-j (j = l, m) agent, who is initially borrowing unconstrained, could become borrowing constrained. This implies that the range of ψ that makes the type-j agent (j = l, m) free from borrowing constraint, (ψ j , ∞), becomes narrower as the income inequality becomes higher.
Second, the spread of income distribution produces positive and negative effects on the preferred debt-to-GDP ratio by each agent. The E 1 -preserving spread of income distribution increases the first-period GDP, E 1 , implying an expansion of the tax base in the first period. This gives the decisive voter an incentive to increase the government spending and, thus, to issue more public debt. In addition, the type-l agent chooses higher government spending and, thus, a higher level of public debt when he/she is a decisive voter because his/her income is decreased by the spread of income distribution. These are positive effects on the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, an increase in the first-period GDP, E 1 , makes the debt-to-GDP ratio lower for a given B; this is a negative effect.
When the type-j (= l or m) agent is borrowing constrained, the positive effect becomes smaller than the negative effect because he/she is unable to freely reallocate resources between the two periods. His/her policy choice results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio in response to the spread of income distribution. In contrast, the positive effect overcomes the negative effect when he/she is borrowing unconstrained.
Third, under Assumption 2, a type-h agent is always borrowing unconstrained and, thus, prefers a higher B/E 1 in response to the spread of income distribution. However, the preferred level of B/E 1 by a type-h agent is always lower than that by the other two types of agents under Assumption 2. Therefore, the decisive voter is a type-l or type-m agent who prefers a lower B/E 1 between them (Proposition 2).
Based on the above-mentioned three results, we now illustrate changes in preferences over B/E 1 for each type of agent as in Figure 4 . The dotted and solid curves in panel (a) depict the type-j's choices over B/E 1 before and after the spread of income distribution, such that the bold dotted and solid curves cross at this level. Therefore, the range of ψ is divided into four subranges of ψ, as illustrated in Figure 4 :
[ Figure 4 about here.]
For ψ ∈ [1, ψ] , the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-constrained, type-l agent, and he/she still remains the decisive voter after the spread of income distribution. His/her choice over policies results in a lower level of B/E 1 in response to the decrease in his/her income. In contrast, for ψ ∈ ( ψ, ψ l ], the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent. Because of the spread of income distribution, the decisive voter changes from a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent to a borrowing-constrained type-l agent. The policy choice by the latter results in a lower level of B/E 1 than that by the former, as demonstrated in Figure 4 .
, the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent.
The decisive voter changes from a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent to a borrowingconstrained type-l agent. The policy choice by the latter results in a higher level of B/E 1 than that by the former as demonstrated in Figure 4 . Finally, for ψ ∈ ( ψ ′ , +∞), the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent, and he/she still remains the decisive voter after the spread of income distribution. His/her choice over policies results in a higher level of B/E 1 in response to the spread of income distribution.
Conclusion
This paper developed the two-period, three-class of income model with borrowing constraints (i.e., capital market imperfection), and studied the politics of redistributive expenditure financed by tax and government debt. In our framework, a borrowingunconstrained agent prefers higher government expenditure and debt as his/her firstperiod income becomes lower because he/she wants to compensate his/her income loss today by redistributive expenditure in the future. However, an opposite result holds for a borrowing-constrained agent: he/she prefers lower government expenditure and debt because his/her income becomes lower because he/she is unable to make such compensation under borrowing constraints.
We showed the following three results. First, the type of a decisive voter depends on the degree of capital market imperfection. In particular, the decisive voter becomes the low-income, borrowing-constrained agent, rather than the middle, when the degree of capital market imperfection is high. The economy displays the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium. Second, the political equilibrium generally fails to attain the efficient allocation. In particular, under a certain condition, the political equilibrium attains an underissue of government debt when the degree of capital market imperfection is high.
Third, the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree of capital market imperfection is high. This is because the decisive voter, who is a borrowing-constrained, low-income agent, wants to choose lower government expenditure and debt. The result implies that there is a negative correlation between inequality and debt-to-GDP ratio when the degree of capital market imperfection is low.
The standard result in the literature of politics and government debt is that (i) the political economy displays an overissue of government debt, and (ii) the spread of income distribution results in a greater issue of government debt. Our analysis and results, therefore, show that the standard result does not hold when the borrowing constraint is considered. More importantly, the result of the negative correlation between inequality and debt-to-GDP ratio could provide one possible explanation for the cross-country evidence among OECD countries.
Several research directions for future research are highlighted by our results in this paper. First, we characterized the structure-induced equilibrium of the voting game where agents simultaneously vote over tax and government debt. An interesting question is whether the current result is still true when an alternative concept of equilibrium is adopted. For example, one may study sequential voting or probabilistic voting. Second, we assumed a small open economy where the interest rate is exogenous. This simplifies the analysis and guarantees the analytical treatment of our political game but at the cost of abstracting general equilibrium effects. Third, the default of government debt was not considered in our analysis. Relaxing these assumptions are interesting areas for future research.
A Appendix

A.1 Single-peakedness of Preferences
A.1.1 Single-peakedness of preferences over τ 1 given τ 2 Given τ 2 , letτ 1 (τ 2 , e i 1 ) denote the first-period tax rate satisfying
Then, the preferences of a type-i agent over τ 1 are: 
and
where the second lines for both calculations come from the fact that 1−γ 2 ·τ 2 (1−τ 2 ) > 0. , respectively, and, thus, are single-peaked. 4 The condition 1 − γ 2 · τ 2 (1 − τ 2 ) > 0 always holds because γ is set within the range (1, 2) under Assumption 1, and τ 2 is set within the range (0, 1/2) under Assumption 1 and the convex costs of collecting taxes.
Next, we show that
. From (11) and (15), we have:
By direct calculation, we have:
In words, V i is continuous at τ 1 =τ 1 (τ 2 , e i 1 ), and V iu and V ic have the same slope at
. Given these results with the single peakedness of V iu and V ic , it can be concluded that V i has a unique local Maximum, as demonstrated in Figure 5 . In 
From (13), the preferences of a type-i agent over τ 1 are:
We take the first derivatives of V iu and V ic with respect to τ 2 and obtain:
V iu and V ic are maximized at the same tax rate τ 2 = 1 − 1/γ. Thus, we can conclude that V i has a unique local maximum at τ 2 = 1 − 1/γ; that is, V i is single peaked over τ 2 .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
From (19) and (20), the most preferred second-period tax rate by a type-i agent is given by:
where (16) and (17) and obtain the following most preferred first-period tax rates by a type-i agent when he/she is unconstrained and constrained, respectively:
Next, we derive (G i ) * and (B i ) * . We substitute (21) and (22) into (11) and (12) to obtain G iu and B iu :
and we substitute (21) and (23) into (11) and (12) to obtain G ic and B ic :
Finally, we substitute τ
* and G iu into the condition (7) to find the threshold level of capital market imperfection for a type-i agent:
A.3 Voting Over τ 2 When Preferences Are Characterized by a Constant Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the second-period tax rate is independent of types and capital market imperfections under a logarithmic utility function. Here, we show that the result also holds true as long as the preferences are characterized by a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES). For the purpose of analysis, we consider the following utility function:
where σ represents the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In order to solve the problem, suppose that the borrowing constraint is not binding.
23
The solution to the utility maximization problem yields:
We substitute (26) into the borrowing constraint (3) to obtain the condition where a type-i agent is actually unconstrained in terms of the tax rates τ 1 and τ 2 :
This condition states that the borrowing constraint of a type-i agent does not bind when his/her after-tax income is high in the first period and is low in the second period. Alternatively, suppose that the borrowing constraint is binding; that is, (27) fails to hold. The solution to the utility maximization problem is given by (8), (9) and (10).
We substitute the consumption functions and the first-period government budget constraint (11) into the utility function U i , and obtain the following indirect utility function of a type-i agent:
We take the first derivative of V iu and V ic with respect to τ 2 and obtain:
The result implies that voter's preferences over τ 2 are unaffected by types and capital market imperfections as long as the utility function is characterized by CIES. The intuition behind the result is as follows. An agent chooses τ 2 to maximize his/her second-period after-tax income given by:
regardless of whether he/she is borrowing constrained or not; and whether his/her utility function is characterized by a logarithmic function or CIES. The first line comes from the assumption of e (1) and (2). Thus, maximizing (1 − τ 2 )e i 2 with respect to τ 2 is equivalent to
} that is independent of types and capital market imperfections.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
(i) The differentiation of τ ic 1 with respect to ψ leads to:
Next, we differentiate G ic with respect to ψ and derive the condition for which ∂G ic /∂ψ > 0 holds:
Based on the result in Proposition 1, the following condition holds when a type-i agent is borrowing constrained:
Because the right-hand side of (29) is greater than ψ i , we obtain:
also holds in equilibrium.
(ii) From the result in Proposition 1, we obtain:
From (11), we also obtain:
Finally, we obtain:
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider first the political determination of the second-period tax rate. As demonstrated in Proposition 1, all agents choose the same second-period tax rate, given by τ * 2 = 1−1/γ. This is the equilibrium tax rate in majority voting.
Next, consider the political determination of the first-period tax rate. As demonstrated in Proposition 1, the preferred tax rate by a type-i agent, (τ i 1 )
* , is:
Under Assumption 2, the critical degrees of the three types of agents, ψ l , ψ m , and ψ h are ordered as:
Given this order, a type-h agent is borrowing unconstrained and chooses (τ * for ψ and obtain the following critical degree that changes the order of preferred first-period tax rates by types l and m agents:
Given the definition of ψ i and ψ, we now divide the range of ψ into the following four 
Under the assumption of distribution of three types of agents, a type ranked in the middle of preferred tax rates becomes the decisive voter. That is, the decisive voter is a borrowing-constrained type-l agent for ψ ∈ [1, ψ); it is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent for ψ ∈ [ ψ, ∞). Thus, the equilibrium tax rate determined in majority voting is:
The corresponding levels of G and B are:
These are calculated based on the result in Proposition 1.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
As demonstrated in We consider how the type-j's (j = l, m) preference over B/E 1 is affected by the E 1 -preserving spread of income distribution when he/she is borrowing unconstrained. From (14) in Proposition 1, the preferred debt-to-GDP ratio by an unconstrained type-j's individual is given by:
Differentiation of the above equation with respect to B ju /E 1 , E 1 and e j 1 leads to: Next, we consider how the type-j's (j = l, m) preference over B/E 1 is affected by the E 1 -preserving spread of income distribution when he/she is borrowing constrained. From (14) in Proposition 1, the preferred debt-to-GDP ratio by a constrained type-j's individual is given by: −µ
where the sign of the term { 1 − 2Γ(e 
A.7.3 Decisive voter's choice over B/E 1
Based on the results established so far, we can illustrate changes in preferences over B/E 1 by three types of agents, as in Figure 4 .
The bold dotted and solid curves depict the decisive voter's choices over B/E 1 before and after the spread of income distribution, respectively. The spread of income distribution increases the threshold level of ψ that distinguishes the type of a decisive voter, 5 The parameter ψ included in Γ satisfy ψ ≤ ψ j because we assume that the type-j agent (j = l, m) is now borrowing constrained (Proposition 1). By the use of the definition of ψ j in Proposition 1, we can write:
1 − 2Γ(e For ψ ∈ ( ψ, ψ l ], the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent.
Because of the spread of income distribution, the decisive voter changes from a borrowingunconstrained type-m agent to a borrowing-constrained type-l agent. The policy choice by the latter results in a lower level of B/E 1 than that by the former, as demonstrated in Figure 4 . For ψ ∈ ( ψ l , ψ ′ ], the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent.
The decisive voter changes from a borrowing-unconstrained type-m agent to a borrowingunconstrained type-l agent. The policy choice by the latter results in a higher level of B/E 1 than that by the former, as demonstrated in Figure 4 . Finally, for ψ ∈ ( ψ ′ , +∞), the initial decisive voter is a borrowing-unconstrained typem agent, and he/she still remains the decisive voter after the spread of income distribution.
His/her choice over policies results in a higher level of B/E 1 in response to the spread of income distribution, as shown in Subsection A.7.1. Thus, the E 1 -preserving spread of income distribution leads to a higher level of B/E 1 . 
